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CASE NOTES
The proposed contract analysis calls for the case-by-case evalu-
ation of the merits of arbitration clauses as severable, bargained-for
agreements. Arbitration agreements executed through the exercise of
grossly disparate bargaining power and knowledge can be invali-
dated through the application of contract principles. The case-by-
case approach permits such egregious agreements to be invalidated
individually. Thus, the overly broad conclusive ban of the Wilko
statutory construction is unnecessary. The case-by-case contract
analysis of agreements to arbitrate securities disputes is capable,
therefore, of effectuating the policies of the securities statutes, as
declared in Wilko, while simultaneously enforcing arbitration
agreements to the extent envisioned by the Arbitration Act.
FRANCIS E. GIBERSON
Securities Law—Rule 10b-5—Civil Liability of Tippers and Tip-
pees: Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. '—
Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill
Lynch), and certain of its officers, directors and employees (the
individual defendants) 2 acquired material inside information 3 con-
cerning the unfavorable earnings outlook for Douglas Aircraft Com-
pany, Inc. through Merrill Lynch's position as prospective manag-
ing underwriter for a new issue of Douglas debentures. 4 The indi-
vidual defendants conveyed this information to certain Merrill
Lynch customers5 (the selling defendants) who, after learning of this
information, either sold from existing positions or made short sales
of more than 165,000 shares of Douglas common on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE). 6 These sales were made prior to a public
announcement of the inside information by Douglas and without
disclosure of the information either to the purchasers of the defen-
dants' stock or to the general investing public.'
The plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased Douglas com-
mon on the NYSE after the selling defendants had sold and before
495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
2
 For the names of the individual defendants and their positions with Merrill Lynch, see
id. at 232 n.4.
3
 This information was essentially that: (1) Douglas would report substantially lower
earnings for the entire first six months than it had reported for the first five months of its 1966
fiscal year; (2) Douglas had sharply lowered its estimate of earnings for its full 1966 fiscal year
since it now expected to have little or no profit for that year; and (3) Douglas had substantially
reduced its projection of earnings for its 1967 fiscal year. id. at 232.
4 Id.
5
 For the names of the selling defendants; most of whom were institutional investors, see
id.
6
 Id. The details of the fact situation arc noted in Investors Management Co., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9267, reprinted in 11970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep., 11 78,163, at 80514, 80516-17 (July 29 1971).
7 495 F.2d at 232.
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the information had become public. 8 However, there was no allega-
tion that any of the plaintiffs had purchased directly from any of the
selling defendants. 9 Shortly after the plaintiffs acquired the stock,
Douglas issued a press release containing the information, after
which the market price of Douglas common dropped substantially.'°
The complaint alleged that defendants breached a duty to disclose to
the general investing public the material inside information concern-
ing the financial condition of Douglas. It further alleged that the
failure to disclose the information was a violation of the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws." Plaintiffs claimed that they
would not have purchased Douglas stock if they had known of the
information withheld by defendants, and therefore that they had
sustained substantial damages as a result of defendants' conduct.
Holding that defendants could be liable for damages to all
persons who, during the relevant period, bought Douglas stock
without knowledge of the inside information, 12 the federal district
court denied defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.° In order to allow
interlocutory appeal the district court certified the question to the
court of appeals.' 4 Affirming the decision below, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit HELD: tippers and tip-
Id. at 233.
'' Id.
1 ° Id.
" Id. at 231. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' acts violated: §§ 10(b) and 15(c)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, i5 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78o(cX1) (1970); Rules 10b-5, 15c-1 and
2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.106-5, 240.15c-1, 2 (1974); and § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Only the allegations raised under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were
involved on appeal. 495' F.2d at 234 n.10. Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange—. .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates ur
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R, § 240.10b-5 (1974).
12
 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
13
 Id. at 268.
" 495 F.2d at 234. The certification was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
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pees who violate the duty to disclose or abstain from trading will be
liable for damages to all persons. who, during the period in which
the tippers and tippees traded in or recommended trading in the
stock concerned, purchased the stock in the open market without
knowledge of the material inside information in the possession of the
tippers and tippees, despite a lack of privity and reliance.'s The
Second Circuit left to the district court the task of determining "the
proper measure of damages." 16
Shapiro appears to expand greatly the scope of the civil liability
of violators of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 106-5. By holding that one who violates his duty to
"disclose or abstain" will be liable to all those who traded in the
stock during the relevant period, the court has created a larger class
of potential plaintiffs. Furthermore, by eliminating the previously
existing requirement that a plaintiff in a non-disclosure case prove
reliance, 17 the court has greatly increased the chances for successful
prosecution of private 1Ob-5 actions.
The court's rationale for holding that both the non-trading
tippers and trading tippees violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
will be discussed in this note. Particular attention will be given to
the elements of a tipper's violation. The court's rationale for impos-
ing civil liability for damages on the respective defendants will then
be analyzed, with the focus of the examination on the court's aban-
donment of the requirements of privity and reliance. Finally, the
desirability of imposing broad civil liability will be considered in
light of both the purposes served by private actions under Rule
10b-5 and other possible resolutions of the issues presented in S hap-
iro
The Second Circuit held that the non-trading tippers' disclosure
of confidential, material inside information to their customers, who
subsequently sold Douglas stock in reliance on such information
violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." This holding was based
upon the Second Circuit's decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.," a SEC injunction action in which it was held that certain
corporate insiders who had disclosed material inside information to
persons who subsequently engaged in transactions in the stock mar-
ket had violated the securities laws. 2 °
The court in Shapiro rejected defendants' two contentions that
the holding in Texas Gulf Sulphur was not applicable in a private
damages action, and that defendants' duty to disclose extended only
to the actual purchasers of defendants' shares. 21 Evaluating the first
15
 495 F.2d at 241.
16 Id. at 242.
17
 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
495 F.2d at 237, 241.
l" 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
20 401 F.2d at 852, 856 n.23.
21 495 F.2d at 236-37.
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contention, the court stated that "the strong public policy considera-
tions behind our 'disclose or abstain' rule there [in Texas Gulf
Sulphur] are equally applicable here."22 The court rejected the
defendants' second contention on the ground that accepting the
defendants' narrow view of their duty would "frustrate a major
purpose of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws: to insure
the integrity and efficiency of the securities markets."23
Thus, Shapiro makes it clear that where a duty to disclose
exists, 24
 disclosure must be made to the entire investing public,
rather than merely to the other party to the transaction. 25 However,
because of some ambiguities in the language of the opinion, there
remains some question as to what the elements of a tipper's violation
are. The question left unanswered is whether tippee trading is
necessary to hold that a tipper violated Rule 10b-5.
There is language in the Shapiro opinion which sugge'sts that
22
 Id. at 236. The same result had been reached in an earlier decision not cited by the
Shapiro court, Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
2-2
 495 F.2d at 237. It has been suggested that the duty to disclose must extend to the
investing public, because "in any active market disclosure to a particular individual is not
feasible . . . ." Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal
Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1361, 1378 (1965). However, the
impracticality of disclosure to particular individuals is only one reason to extend the duty
owed to include the investing public. As the court noted, one of the main purposes of Rule
106-5 is the promotion of the integrity and efficiency of the securities markets. 495 F.2d at
237. By this, the court referred to the market's function of "assessing the value that society
places upon the efforts of a particular enterprise . . . This function can be performed
effectively only if the delicately calibrated balance of factors affecting demand and supply are
allowed to have their impact upon the market place through an unrestricted flow of informa-
tion and funds." Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Limiting the insider's duty to disclose in a market
transaction so as to require disclosure only to those persons who are in privity with him would
not fulfill this purpose of the rule. Even if the insider complied with his duty, transactions
based on knowledge not generally available would still be occurring in the market, thus
distorting the market's estimate of value of that stock.
24
 The district court's opinion, apparently supported in this respect by the court of
appeals, see 495 F.2d at 238, indicates that one in possession of inside information has no
duty to disclose until he either recommends or trades in the security concerned. See Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
However, Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1970-71 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,004, at 90698 (D. Colo. 1970), a case arising out of the
same facts as Shapiro and in which Merrill Lynch was a co-defendant, held that Merrill
Lynch had a duty to disclose the inside information which it possessed, apparently regardless
of whether or not it had divulged the information to others. Id. at 90700. It may be that this
broadly defined duty of disclosure will not be placed upon all those in possession of inside
information. The district court there indicated that the size and relationship of the co-
defendants, and their proximity to the public were important in determining whether the duty
to disclose existed. Id. at 90702.
's The court defined the group to whom defendants owed a duty as "all persons who
during the same period purchased Douglas stock in the open market without knowledge of the
material inside information which was in the possession of defendants." 495 F.2d at 237. This
seems to confuse the question of the scope of defendants' duty with the question of who has
standing to sue for the breach of that duty. The correct view, as enunciated in the Texa5 Gulf
Sulphur opinion, is that the duty extends to the entire "investing public." SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
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tippee trading is an essential element of a tipper violation. 26 The
court said that for the purpose of determining whether section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 were violated, one of the "critical facts" is that the
tippees sold Douglas common. 27 The court's reliance on the holding
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, a case in which the tippees traded, 28 also
suggests the existence of the requirement of tippee trading. How-
ever, there are also indications in the Shapiro opinion that the court
does not regard tippee trading as a sine qua non of a tipper's
violation. The court stated that the defendants violated the se-
curities laws "by trading in or recommending trading in" Douglas
common. 29 Furthermore, in defining the scope of their liability, the
court noted that the defendants would be liable for damages to
plaintiffs who had purchased Douglas common in the open market
during the same period defendants had traded in or recommended
trading in that stock. 3 ° If the court meant that a tipper's liability is
determined by the period within which he recommended trading in
the stock, it follows that his violation of Rule 10b-5 occurred at the
point at which the recommendation was made and not when his
tippee subsequently traded. 3 '
There are apparently valid policy arguments in support of a
rule that tipping is a violation independent of tippee trading. The
purposes of Rule 10b-5 are best served by discouraging the selective
disclosure of material inside information at its source. This purpose
is most effectively accomplished by viewing the tipper's act as a
violation without regard to his tippee's actions. However, while this
may be a desirable end, it may not be achievable through use of
Rule 10b-5 since, in the absence of tippee trading, the requisite "in
connection with the sale or purchase of a security" element seems to
be lacking. 32
 At least one case, SEC v. Lums, Inc. 33 has held that
tippee trading is essential to a tipper's violation. In that case, a
director of the defendant corporation had conveyed material infor-
mation concerning Lum's revised earnings forecast to a broker. The
broker in turn had relayed this information to one of his customers
who subsequently sold his holdings in Lum's'stock. In discussing the
scope of Rule 10b-5, the court said that disclosure of material,
non-public corporate information was a violation of the Rule, where
26
 495 F.2d at 235-36.
21
 Id, See also text at note 18 supra.
25
 401 F.2d at 841 n.4, 852, 856 n.23.
a' 495 F.2d at 238 (emphasis added),
;) Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
11
 See 2 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud
—SEC Rule 10b-5 § 7,5(3)(c), at 190.9
(1973); SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., 11967-69 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.,
11 92,280, at 97342 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8459, reprinted in 11967-69 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep., 11 77,629, at 83347, 83349 (Nov. 25, 1968) (all indicating that tippee trading may not be
an essential element of a tipper's violation).
32
 For the language of Rule 10b-5, sec note 11 supra.
31
 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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it was foreseeable that the information would or might be traded
upon, and a purchase or sale in fact took place. 34 Whether or not
tipping alone is a violation of Rule 10b-5, it would seem that a
tipper whose tippee does not trade will not be liable for damages
since no private party has been injured absent any trading. 35
Turning its attention to.the tippees, the Shapiro court held that
the duty to disclose or abstain would also be imposed on them. 36
The tippees argued that, since they were not in a position to make
effective public disclosure of information about a company with
which they were not associated, a distinction should be drawn
between them and the tippers. 37 The court rejected this contention,
stating that the duty imposed is not a naked duty of disclosure, but
a duty to abstain from trading unless disclosure is made."
The court did say that a tippee's duty to disclose was predi-
cated upon his knowledge or constructive knowledge of the
confidential corporate source of the information. 39 Thus, those re-
mote tippees who are unaware of the original source of the tip do
not possess a duty either to abstain or disclose, and will not violate
the Rule by trading. However, it has been suggested that, since
remote tippee trading is a foreseeable risk of tipping, a tipper may
be civilly liable in damages for the transactions of even remote
tippees."
Defendants' principal argument against the imposition of liabil-
ity in this action was that their activity did not cause damage to the
plaintiffs. They argued that the plaintiffs, being ignorant of defen-
dants' actions, did not in any way rely on the defendants, and thus
would have purchased Douglas stock whether or not defendants had
violated the law by trading.'" They also argued that the precarious
financial condition of Douglas, rather than defendants' securities
laws violations, precipitated the sudden, substantial drop in the
market price of Douglas stock and thus constituted the cause of the
losses sustained by the plaintiffs. 42
These arguments present two distinct points: (1) that defen-
dants did not induce the plaintiffs to buy, and hence any losses
suffered by the plaintiffs because they did buy were not caused by
the defendants; and (2) that defendants' illegal transactions did not
adversely affect the value of Douglas common, and hence any losses
suffered by the plaintiffs because of a drop in the value of their
stock were not caused by the defendants. 43
34 Id. at 1057,
31
 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 31, § 7.5(4), at 190.11.
36 495 F.2d at 237.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 238.
3" Id.
40 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 31, § 7.5(4), at 190.12.
4 ' 495 F.2d at 238.
42 Id.
43 The idea of causation has received little scrutiny in 10b-5 cases, and is not yet
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The court, apparently ignoring defendants' second conten-
tion," held that the plaintiffs had shown causation in fact by proof
of non-disclosure of a material fact. 45 Prior to this decision, a
plaintiff in a non-disclosure case was required to show both that the
defendant had failed to disclose a material fact and that the plaintiff
}Awl relied upon the fact, i.e., that he would have acted differently
had he known of the withheld fact. 46 The Shapiro decision removes
the need to prove reliance in a 10b(5) non-disclosure case, an ele-
ment•on which many a plaintiffs,case has faltered. 47 By requiring
that a plaintiff in a non-disclosure case show only the defendant's
breach of a duty to state a material fact in order to prove causation
in fact, the Shapiro court may greatly facilitate recovery in such
cases.
The court based its holding that the plaintiffs had established
causation primarily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States. - 48 There, the plaintiffs were mixed-
blood Indians who had held shares in the property of the tribe.
Defendants were a bank, which had agreed to act as transfer agent
for the shares and which had physical possession of the shares, and
two employees who purchased the Indians' shares for ,their own
accounts and those of others. Plaintiffs alleged that the two em-
ployees had violated Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform the plaintiffs of
their position as market makers and of facts regarding the true value
of the stock. The court of appeals held that there was no showing of
reliance and hence there could be, no recovery under Rule 10b-5. 4 "
The Supreme Court reversed, on the grounds that under the circum-
stances of the case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive
proof of reliance was not a prerequisite to recovery. The withhold-
ing of a material fact established causation in fact."
The defendants in Shapiro argued that the Ute decision did not
apply to their case, since the fact situations were distinguishable.
They pointed out that unlike Ute, there were no face to face transac-
developed to the base point of distinguishing between causation of the transaction
and causation of the economic loss. The former seems adequately supplied by
materiality and reliance . . . . The latter appears to be the proper focus for inquiry.
2 A. Bromberg, supra note 31, § 8.7(1), at 215-16. In Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F.
Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court noted that to establish defendants' liability, plaintiffs
would have to show both transaction causation and loss causation. Id. at 1341-42.
44 While there might be cases in which the withheld facts which caused a plaintiff to
make the transaction did not, when released, cause the harmful change in the stock's value,
Shapiro is not such a case. The facts concealed were those that did result in Douglas stock's
diminution in value. This may be why the court did not discuss defendants' second conten-
tion,
45 495 F.2d at 238.
46 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir, 1965).
47 E.g., Reyos v, United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 464 (2d Cir. 1965).
48 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
49 Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970).
50 406 U.S. at 153-54.
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tions in Shapiro." Reasoning that the test of causation in fact
established by Ute applied to transactions on national securities
exchanges as well as in face to face situations, the court rejected this
contention. 52
The Second Circuit did not discuss defendants' further argu-
ment that the Ute test was intended to apply only in cases, unlike
Shapiro, where the plaintiff could show a general reliance upon the
defendant," although this argument is supported by Simon v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.," a Rule 10b-5 action.
There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had withheld certain
material inside information. The district court found that the plain-
tiff had failed to prove specific reliance." Plaintiff argued that Ute
was applicable, and hence he did not have to show specific reliance
on particular omissions to establish causation in fact. The Fifth
Circuit held that a plaintiff in a non-disclosure case must show
general reliance on a defendant's representations in order to have
the benefit of the Ute test of causation in fact. 56 The court found
that Ute did not apply to the case before it, since the facts showed
that the plaintiff was a sophisticated investor who made his own
investment decisions and did not generally rely on the defendant's
recommendations. 57
The resolution of the Second and Fifth Circuits' conflicting
interpretations of Ute is of great importance for future 10b-5 actions.
However, it is not entirely clear which interpretation is correct. It is
true, as the Simon court noted," that Ute involved unsophisticated
investors who "considered [the] defendants to be familiar with the
market for the shares of stock and relied upon them when they
desired to sell their shares."59 Thus, it may be that the Court's
concern for these unsophisticated investors caused it to fashion a
limited exception to the usual test for causation in fact. However, the
language of the Court's holding seems to support the Shapiro court's
interpretation of unrestricted applicability:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving
primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is
not a prerequisite to recovery. . . . [The] obligation to
disclose and [the] withholding of a material fact establish
the requisite element of causation in fact. 6°
41 495 F.2d at 240.
52 Id.
53 See Brief for Defendant-Appellants at 22-23, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir• 1974).
54 482 F.2d 880 (5th Cir• 1973).
55 [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 93,604, at 92783 (N.D. Tex.
1972).
56 482 F.2d at 884.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 406 U.S. 128, 152 (1972).
6° Id. at 152-53.
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The elimination of the element of reliance in Rule 10b-5 non-
disclosure cases virtually establishes a scheme of investors insur-
ance, something the Rule was arguably not designed to
accomplish. 6 '
Given the Supreme Court's manifest intention to interpret
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as not requiring positive proof of
reliance, at least in situations similar to those presented in Ute, it is
arguable that, in the interest of fairness, the coverage of this "inves-
tors insurance" should be limited to those who are financially un-
sophisticated and who generally rely on the defendant's recommen-
dations. This would have the effect of removing the large bulk of
securities transactions from the scope of the investors insurance,
while providing extra protection to those arguably most in need of
it. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the Shapiro court's interpreta-
tion of Ute will be far more effective in fulfilling the three major
purposes of private 10b-5 actions, i.e., deterrence, disgorgement,
and compensation, 62 since it will permit any of the many potential
plaintiffs in such an action to establish a right to recovery upon a
showing of non-disclosure of a material fact. The Simon court's
narrower interpretation would not be nearly as effective. Since it
would be the rare case in which a plaintiff could establish his
general reliance upon the defendant's advice, and thus qualify for
the benefit of the We causation in fact test, the Simon court's
interpretation would have the effect of imposing the pre-Ute re-
quirement of proof of specific reliance in most cases.
The Shapiro court alternatively held that, even on the basis of
the pre-Ute decisions, the plaintiffs had established causation in
fact. The court relied primarily upon List v. Fashion Park, Inc."
for this holding. The plaintiff in List was a minority stockholder of
Fashion Park, Inc., who had determined to sell his shares in the
company shortly after the directors of the corporation, unknown to
the plaintiff, had passed a resolution that the company seek to
negotiate a sale or merger." A defendant, one of the directors,
purchased some of plaintiff's shares. The director revealed neither
the fact of his position nor the existence of the corporation's decision
to sell or merge. Sometime after the Plaintiff had sold his shares at a
modest profit, a sale of the company was effectuated at a large profit
per share." The plaintiff subsequently brought an action, claiming
that the defendant had violated Rule 10b-5 by not disclosing his
corporate position or the possibility of a future sale of the
corporation. 66 The court held that in a non-disclosure case, the
6 ' List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
" See text at notes 70-74 infra.
63 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965),
" 340 F.2d at 460.
65 Id.	 •
66
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plaintiff had to show his reliance upon a material, withheld fact in
order to establish causation. It explained that to show reliance, the
plaintiff need only prove that he would have acted differently if the
fact withheld had been disclosed. 67
 However, the court found, .on
the facts, that the plaintiff had not shown reliance, because he failed
to prove that he would not have sold his stock if he had known of
the defendant's position." Relying upon the List test for causation,
the Shapiro court held that the plaintiffs' allegation, that they would
not have bought Douglas common if the withheld information had
been disclosed, established a claim of causation in fact sufficient to
withstand the motion to dismiss. 69
An evaluation of the desirability of the broad scope of liability
Shapiro imposed on the tippers and tippees must proceed from an
understanding of the place of civil damage suits in securities law. By
rejecting defendants' argument that adequate sanctions for viola-
tions of Rule 10b-5 already exist in the form of administrative and
injunctive proceedings which can be brought by the SEC, the Shap-
iro court recognized that a primary purpose for allowing private
actions is the resulting increase in the deterrent effect of the se-
curities laws. 7° Another important purpose is to divest one who has
violated the law of his gains. As Professor Loss has noted with
respect to damage recoveries: "tAls with the many prophylactic rules
developed in the law of trusts, it is more important to take the profit
away from the insider than to worry about who gets it." 71 Although
the court in Shapiro did not rule on the question of the amount of
damages, it did imply that the district court should limit the dam-
ages recoverable to the profits made by or the compensation paid to
the defendants. 72
 This indicates that one of the court's primary
interests may be the disgorgement of the defendants' profits.
The final function of civil damage actions in securities law is to
compensate those injured by the unlawful conduct. The Shapiro
court did not directly discuss this purpose of civil damage actions,
although it noted that a factor relevant to the determination of
damages is "what expenses were incurred and what lossed were
sustained by the plaintiffs .. . 
."73
 The compensatory function of
damages in cases where the Rule 10b-5 violations occurred in the
open-market has apparently not been pressed very vigorously by
those courts or writers who have advocated liability to all those
trading in the security during the relevant period. A reason for this
may be that a requirement that an illegal trader make whole all
those who were in the market during the relevant period would be
67
 Id. at 462-63.
68 Id, at 464.
68 495 F.2d at 240.
7° Id. at 241 n.18.
71 6 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 3575 (Supp. 1969).
72 495 F.2d at 242.
73 Id.
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likely to inflict financial destruction upon the violator, a result
which seems unwarranted. 74 Thus, it can be seen that the compen-
sation of victims of securities laws violations is a less important
purpose in private actions with fact situations similar to that of
Shapiro.
In light of the deterrence and disgorgement purposes of private
10b-5 actions for damages, it appears that the Shapiro rule will be
fairly effective in furthering the goals of Rule 10b-5. By expanding
the class of persons able to bring actions for these violations, and
lowering their burden of proof on the matter of causation, the court
has increased the threat of successful private actions, and thus
greatly increased the deterrent and disgorgement effect of such
actions." However, there exists one drawback to allowing a large
class of persons to bring actions against 10b-5 defendants. Assuming
that the court will limit the liability of a defendant to the amount of
his profit, the Shapiro rule will have little deterrent or disgorgement
effect where the defendant is a small trader in a relatively active
market. In that case, the amount of damages available to any
individual plaintiff may be too small to induce anyone to bring the
suit. 76 Thus, persons with inside information might not be deterred
from carrying on relatively small transactions under the Shapiro
approach.
The appropriateness of the Shapiro rule establishing broad civil
liability should be evaluated in light of the alternatives. One alterna-
tive which has been proposed is to limit the scope of a defendant's
liability to include only those injured persons in privity with him."
Analyzing this proposal in light of the purposes of private 10b-5
actions for damages, it can be seen that there would be both advan-
tages and disadvantages in comparison to the Shapiro approach. A
great disadvantage of requiring privity is the reduction in the
number of possible plaintiffs. It is arguable that if there are fewer
people who have standing to sue,' there is less likelihood that an
action will be brought. Thus, the deterrent and disgorgement effect
of private actions will be decreased. More importantly, given the
impersonal nature of the securities exchanges, establishing privity
with a particular defendant will be a difficult task. It has been said
that in such cases, privity could be established only by the fortuitous
74 Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 Duke L.J. 1125,
1132; Note, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1421, 1423 (1970); Note, 30 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 527, 545
(197.3).
75 It may be argued that a rule which requires that a person who has made an illegal
gain merely return that gain has little deterrent effect, since a person faced with such limited
liability has much to gain and little to lose. However, this does not necessitate the conclusion
that such a rule is totally ineffectual. Private 10b-5 actions are designed to complement rather
than substitute for SEC civil and criminal enforcement of the securities laws. It is the effect of
private actions in combination with other sanctions which results in the deterrent effect.
76
 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 31, § 8.7(2), at 219; Note, 80 Harv, L, Rev, 468, 476
(1968).
77 Note, 80 Huy. L. Rev. 468, 476 (1968).
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matching of time-stamped purchase and sale orders. 78 Thus, while
proving privity is not an impossible task," establishing standing to
sue will be much easier under the Shapiro rule.
However, there are two apparent advantages to the require-
ment of privity. In the case of small traders on active markets,
limiting the right of recovery to those in privity with the defendant
would have the advantage of decreasing the number of persons who
could share in the relatively small recovery, thus increasing the
chances that a suit would be brought, and enhancing the deterrent
and disgorgement effects of private actions. Secondly, limiting the
right to recovery to those in privity with the defendant would seem
to fulfill the compensatory function of these actions, since there
would be no artificial limitation on recovery precluding the award of
full damages to each plaintiff."
It is submitted, however, that the advantages of the Shapiro
rule outweigh those of the rule limiting recovery to those in privity
with the defendant. The larger class of potential plaintiffs, and the
ease with which they can establish a right to damages will be far
more effective in fulfilling the deterrent and disgorgement purposes
of private actions by making the institution and success of such
actions more likely. This advantage does not seem to be outweighed
by the increase in deterrent and disgorgement effect on small trans-
actions that the privity rule would generate.
Although the privity rule appears to fulfill the compensatory
function of private lOb-5 actions, it is arguable that one in fortuitous
privity with a Rule Mb-5 violator should have no greater right to
recovery than anyone else who traded in the stock during the
relevant period. The duty of disclosure extends to the entire invest-
ing public. If that duty is breached by trading without revealing
inside information to the public, then all persons who traded in the
stock are equally injured by trading at an over or under rated price.
The fact that some people have by chance acquired shares traceable
to the defendant should not give them a right to recovery to the
exclusion of their less fortunate fellow traders. 8 ' If this is so, then a
78
 " Where transactions are executed on an exchange, the difficulty of matching purchases
and sales between given individuals is such that liability would depend only upon a more or
less fortuitous matching of time-stamped purchase and sale orders or certificates subsequently
delivered to the clearing house." Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the De-
velopment of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1361, 1377-78
(1965).
79 W. Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations A-I12 (4th ed. 1969).
	 •
0° It should be noted that the effect of allowing only those in privity with the defendant
to recover full damages will be to limit the amount of damages to the amount of the
defendant's profit, since the measure of a plaintiff's loss is also the measure of a defendant's
gain. 2 A. Bromberg, supra note 31, §§ 7.4(6)(e) n.198, 8.7(2) n.80, at 188, 218. Thus, in this
respect, a rule limiting the liability of the defendant to those in privity with him will have no
greater, or lesser, deterrent or disgorgement effect than the Shapiro rule.
81
 Professors Painter and Loss reject the privity theory, asserting that the fortuitous
matching of buy and sell orders should not give one person a greater right to recovery than
another. Painter, supra note 78, at 1378; Loss, supra note 71, at 3574.
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rule limiting recovery to those in privity with the defendant would
not come any closer to fulfilling the compensatory purpose, since
many persons with a claim to compensation would go totally
unsatisfied, while only a few would be made whole. It is submitted
that it may be more equitable to provide at least some compensation
for all, rather than full compensation for the few who can establish
privity through the fortuitous matching of buy and sell orders.
Finally, the compensatory function of private damage actions in the
case of open-market violations of the disclose or abstain rule is open
to serious question under either the privity or the Shapiro rule. 82
The court's finding of the Rule 10b-5 violations on the part of
all defendants is clearly supported by reason and authority. How-
ever, there is some question as to whether the authority depended
upon for the imposition of such broad civil liability for damages
supports the court's conclusions. In any case, the result of Shapiro
seems desirable in terms of its effectiveness in fulfilling the purposes
of private actions in Rule 10b-5 cases.
ROGER BRUNELLE
Securities Law—Fraud—Rule 10b 75 Private Actions—Adoption of
Flexible Duty Standard—White v. Abrams ' —Defendant, Abrams,
was a trusted friend and investment advisor of plaintiffs, White and
others. Abrams encouraged plaintiffs to make substantial invest-
ments in several corporations which subsequently went bankrupt. 2
The corporations paid Abrams substantial commissions for obtain-
ing the investments. 3 Plaintiffs brought a suit seeking rescission and
punitive damages for violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 4
 section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 SEC
Hi Thus, it has been argued that a violation of Rule 10b-5 of the type which occurred in
Shapiro has not really damaged anybody. Note, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 468, 475 (1966); Comment,
16 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 404, 409-10 (1969).
,•
495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974),
2 Id. at 727.
3 Id.
4
 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Since the relevant language of section I7(a) is almost
identical to the language of Rule 106-5, the court assumed that the elements of a private
action under that section are the same as those of an action under Rule 10b-5. 495 F.2d at 727
n.2.
5
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), which provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange—. . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
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